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UberPop, UberBlack, and the Regulation of
Digital Platforms after the Asociación
Profesional Elite Taxi Judgment of the CJEU
Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) 20 December 2017,
Asociación Profesional Elite Taxi (C-434/15)
https://doi.org/10.1515/ercl-2018-1005
On those grounds, the Court (Grand Chamber) hereby rules:
Article 56 TFEU, read together with Article 58(1) TFEU, as well as Article 2(2)(d)
of Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 Decem-
ber 2006 on services in the internal market, and Article 1(2) of Directive 98/34/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998 laying down a procedure
for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations and
of rules on Information Society services, as amended by Directive 98/48/EC of the
European Parliament and of Council of 20 July 1998, towhich Article 2(a) of Directive
2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain
legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the
Internal Market (‘Directive on electronic commerce’) refers, must be interpreted as
meaning that an intermediation service such as that at issue in themain proceedings,
the purpose of which is to connect, by means of a smartphone application and for
remuneration, nonprofessional drivers using their own vehicle with persons who wish
to make urban journeys, must be regarded as being inherently linked to a transport
service and, accordingly, must be classified as ‘a service in the field of transport’
within the meaning of Article 58(1) TFEU. Consequently, such a service must be
excluded from the scope of Article 56 TFEU, Directive 2006/123 and Directive 2000/
31.
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The case concerning a smartphone transport application provided by Uber,
decided by the Grand Chamber of the CJEU on 20 December 2017, has the poten-
tial to reshape the regulation of contracting in the digital economy. More pre-
cisely, it specifies the rules applicable to online platforms serving as intermedi-
aries between parties demanding and offering services. The criteria the CJEU uses
to reach its conclusion are likely to have repercussions far beyond the area of
transportation applications.
This Case Note starts by presenting the facts of the case and the legal back-
ground of those EU law provisions potentially governing digital intermediaries. It
then explores the criteria the Court uses to distinguish Uber from simple inter-
mediation services, followed by a discussion and critique of these criteria. In the
last two sections, it maps out the implications of the judgment for the platform
economy, and suggests that a decisive impetus of the judgment should be a
thorough review of regulations governing the provision of services in the EU.
I Facts and Legal Background
The factual and legal background of the judgment is as follows. According to the
Court, Uber Systems Spain SL (Uber), a company related to the well-known
technology company Uber Technologies Inc, provided, inter alia, a smartphone
application connecting non-professional drivers in Spain with potential custo-
mers for rides in urban areas. As will be analyzed in detail in Section IV, Uber has
implemented different business models. The one under scrutiny here, whose
hallmark is the use of non-professional drivers, is the business model the com-
pany started out with, called UberPop. As Advocate General Szpunar remarked in
his Opinion,1 however, there is some doubt about whether Uber Systems Spain SL
really ran the smartphone application or whether the service was not rather
provided by Uber BV, a Dutch company managing Uber’s European business,
with the Spanish company merely providing marketing. This would imply that
Uber BV, and not the Spanish company, should have been sued for the claim to
succeed. If this was true, the questions asked by the referring court would not be
relevant for the decision of the case at issue, and would therefore have been
inadmissible under Article 267(2) TFEU. The CJEU, however, followed the Advo-
cate General in leaving these factual questions for the referring court to resolve.
1 A. G. Szpunar, opinion of 11 May 2017 in case 434/15 Asociación Profesional Elite Taxi EU:
C:2017:364, para 12, 17, 79.
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What is beyond doubt is that customers wishing to make journeys were
matched by the smartphone application with non-professional drivers who did
not possess an administrative license or authorization for transportation of pas-
sengers; neither did Uber. Customers paid for the rides through the application
directly to Uber, which passed on part of the fare to the drivers. In late 2014, the
Barcelona Taxi Association ‘Elite Taxi’ brought an action before a Commercial
Court in Barcelona seeking a cease-and-desist order against Uber for violation of
the local regulation governing taxi transportation (for lack of a taxi licence) and
the Spanish law on unfair competition. The referring Commercial Court essen-
tially wanted to know how to classify Uber: as a taxi company or as a mere
provider of an information society service.
This distinction is crucial to determine the law applicable to digital match-
making platforms. If, on the one hand, they are classified as a company in the field
of the services for which they act as an intermediary, they are subject to the full
force of regulations governing regulated sectors, such as the taxi market. Further-
more, the freedom to provide services, enshrined in Article 56 TFEU and spelt out
more concretely in the Services Directive 2006/123/EC, is inapplicable to services
in the field of transport, according to Article 58(1) TFEU and Article 2(2)(d) of the
Services Directive. This entails that the restrictive provisions on authorization
schemes provided for in Article 9 of the Services Directive are equally inapplic-
able. If, on the other hand, intermediaries are classified as an information society
service, they may avail themselves of a number of privileges for these services
contained in EU law. The concept of an ‘information society service’, therefore, is
a key concept of EU law for the regulation of the digital economy. More precisely,
Article 1(2) of the Information Society Services Directive 98/34/EC defines an
information society service as ‘any service normally provided for remuneration, at
a distance, by electronic means and at the individual request of a recipient of
services’; this is reiterated identically in Article 1(1)(b) of the revised Information
Society Services Directive (EU) 2015/1535. The definition is taken up by Article 2(a)
of the E-Commerce Directive 2000/31/EC, which applies only to providers of
information society services, Article 1(1). Article 3(2) of the E-Commerce Directive,
in connection with Article 3(4), establishes a wide-ranging freedom to provide
information society services in the internal market and subjects Member State
restrictions to strict scrutiny. Moreover, Articles 12–15 of the E-Commerce Directive
seek to shield information society service providers from liability for the content
they store or transmit in a merely technical and neutral manner, for example if
they act as ‘mere conduits’ (Article 12), ‘caches’ (Article 13) or ‘hosts’ (Article 14).
Therefore, the entire regulatory framework depends on whether Uber, and other
digital platforms, are classified as information society services or as services in the
field of activities they intermediate.
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II The Contents of the Judgment
The Grand Chamber of the Court started by noting that the intermediation service
provided by Uber is in principle distinct from the transport service offered by Uber
drivers. Given the electronic nature of the intermediation, the service provided by
Uber, at least generally, fulfils the criteria of an information society service
pursuant to Article 1(2) of the Information Society Services Directive. Traditional
taxi services, by contrast, constitute services in the field of transport.
Had the Court stopped its analysis at this point, the regulation of the digital
economy would likely have taken a different turn. Uber, and other digital plat-
forms following a similar business model, would not have been subject to the
substantive rules governing the activities they intermediate, such as licensing
requirements. However, following the Advocate General,2 the Grand Chamber in a
second step argued that the services offered by Uber go beyond mere intermedia-
tion. The software tools provided and operated by Uber, and the influence Uber
exercises over the organization of the transportation service, are deemed essential
components of the transportation service, inextricably linked to the physical
activity on the ground. In the most important passage of the judgment, the Court
advances three main factual criteria that drive the conclusion that the service
provided by Uber is, in addition to an intermediation, also a transportation
service (para 39 of the judgment). First, the drivers are selected by Uber and have
to file an application as a necessary prerequisite for providing their transportation
service. Second, the travellers would not use the services of the non-professional
drivers without the digital intermediation by Uber. Finally, the platform exercises
‘decisive influence’ over the provision of the transportation service itself. The
Court again adopts this term, and its analysis, from the opinion of the Advocate
General.3 For example, Uber sets the maximum fare for the trip, which is shown to
passengers up front and from which drivers do not actually deviate;4 it receives
the remuneration from the client and passes part of it on to the driver; and it
controls, to a certain extent, the quality of the vehicles, the drivers and their
conduct, reserving itself even the right to exclude drivers whose passenger ratings
drop below a certain threshold.5 To consolidate its analysis, the Court noted that
according to settled case law,6 the concept of ‘services in the field of transport’
2 Szpunar, n 1 above, para 39 et seq.
3 Szpunar, n 1 above, para 35.
4 See also Szpunar, n 1 above, para 49 and 50.
5 Cf Szpunar, n 1 above, para 13.
6 CJEU, case 168/14 Grupo Itevelesa and Others EU:C:2015:685, para 46; see also CJEU, opinion 2/
15 Free Trade Agreement with Singapore EU:C:2017:376, para 61.
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includes any service ‘inherently linked’ to the physical transportation exercise
itself.
The immediate legal consequence of Uber’s decisive influence is that its
business model of ‘intermediation plus control’ is seen as one overall service. In a
second step, the Court then has to identify the main component of that service to
determine the legal regime applicable to it. In the case of UberPop, the main
component, according to the Court, is the transportation service. This bars the
service from being qualified as an information society service. Therefore, Uber
does not benefit from the privileges of the E-Commerce Directive as they require
the provision of an information society service (Articles 1(1), 2(a) of the E-Com-
merce Directive). Moreover, the Services Directive does not apply to Uber since its
Article 2(2)(d) explicitly excludes services in the field of transport. Similarly,
according to Article 58(1) TFEU, Uber may not avail itself of the freedom to provide
services enshrined in Article 56 TFEU, either, but is governed by the provisions on
transport in Articles 90 et seq. TFEU. They establish a framework for an EU-wide
common transport policy in Article 90 TFEU. Article 91(1) TFEU confers the com-
petence for implementing the common transport policy to the European Parlia-
ment and the Council. However, they have not exercised their competence in
this field yet. Therefore, the CJEU reasoned, Member States may validly regulate
transportation applications such as Uber, just as they regulate taxi companies.
The judgment hence creates a level playing field – between digital and traditional
ride-hailing companies. It clarifies that both have to abide by the same rules if the
digital company exercises a decisive influence on the transportation activity itself.
In sum, the judgment establishes a two-step test to determine the rules
applicable to platforms offering composite services. First, if the platform exercises
decisive influence over multiple service components and if they are inherently
linked, they are considered one overall service. Second, the main component of
this overall service determines the applicable rules. In the case of intermediation
versus a substantive service, the main component will generally be seen in the
substantive service.
III Discussion and Critique of the Judgment
While the second part of the test follows more orthodox jurisprudence,7 three
important questions arise with respect to the Court’s reasoning and conclusions
concerning the first part of the test, ie, the criteria that inherently link intermedia-
7 See below, last para of this Section.
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tion to the transportation service. They have to be answered before we can map
out the implications of the judgment beyond the UberPop case. First, are the three
criteria offered by the Court convincing? Second, what happens if not all three of
them are fulfilled? And third, why exactly does the fulfillment of the criteria bar
the service from being qualified as an information society service?
Turning first to the merits of the three criteria used by the Court, we may note
that they are partially distinct, and partially overlapping. First, there is the
selection procedure of the drivers, ie, of those wishing to offer their services on
the platform. The Court seems to highlight the fact that drivers do not only have
to register, but have to present an application that goes beyond the mere formality
of identifying the contracting party. While it is unclear from the judgment how
exactly the selection process takes place, the Advocate General mentions the
existence of quality screening procedures that accompany the scrutiny of the
applications.8 This already introduces the first element of control of the platform
over the services provided. The screening procedure is therefore better understood
as part of the third criterion that covers the control aspect. What remains from the
first criterion is the mere registration (identification) of service providers, which is
intrinsic to any kind of intermediation activity. The second criterion, the fact that
travelers would not use the services of the non-professional drivers if the applica-
tion did not connect them, is again inherent to any valuable intermediation tool.
One must look at the opinion of the Advocate General to understand what may be
meant by this criterion: the fact that the application itself created the supply by
enabling agents to provide the service in question that, otherwise, would not have
done so.9 However, this is typical of any successful intermediation tool that makes
a market grow and therefore inspires entry into the market. Therefore, the first
two criteria (excepting the screening procedure) provide no convincing argu-
ments for treating Uber different from any other intermediation platform, such as
eBay, for example.
While the Court mentions the third criterion, the decisive influence over the
transportation exercise itself, only as an additional factor, it must really be
considered the core element of the Court’s analysis. Indeed, there is mounting
social science research pointing to the high degree of influence Uber exercises
over the working conditions of its drivers.10 There are essentially two reasons for
accepting the Court’s conclusion that ‘intermediation plus control’ is fundamen-
8 Szpunar, n 1 above, para 45 and 46.
9 Szpunar, n 1 above, para 43.
10 See, eg, R. Calo and A. Rosenblat, ‘The Taking Economy: Uber, Information, and Power’
(2017) 117 Columbia Law Review 1623; A. Rosenblat et al, ‘Discriminating Tastes: Uber’s Customer
Ratings as Vehicles forWorkplace Discrimination’ (2017) 9 Policy & Internet 256.
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tally different from mere intermediation. First, if the platform exercises decisive
influence over the substantive service, the platformmaterially supplies the service
and only uses the supply side actors (for example, Uber drivers) as instruments. In
this case, the platform shapes, through contractual agreements and/or factual
behavior, the economically and socially relevant parameters of the service, and is
therefore primarily responsible for its success or failure. This not only implies that
the platform will often be best positioned, as the central, organizing entity, to
enforce quality standards imposed by substantive regulation in a cost-effective
way; to the extent that the platform primarily causes, and monetarily receives, the
profits from the substantive service provided, it should also bear the (legal) risks
accompanying it. Second, if the platform controls parameters that are of direct
relevance for competition with traditional providers of the substantive service,
such as taxi companies, it makes sense to subject all competing parties to the same
regulations. As the Advocate General highlighted in his opinion, Uber, for exam-
ple, controls all the economically relevant parameters in UberPop.11 The applica-
tion of the same rules to traditional and digital companies determining the
economic characteristics of substitutable products creates a level playing field
and avoids undue advantage of platforms that offer comparable services in digital
formats. The focus on control, understood as decisive influence, therefore pre-
vents regulatory arbitrage bydigital companies, pretending to act only as interme-
diaries, but really substantially providing a service without being subject to the
same rules as those that provide the service inmore traditional formats.12
The preceding discussion already points to the answer to the second ques-
tion. If the control element is largely lacking and the platform only registers
suppliers of services and enables customers to connect with them (first two
criteria), it should, arguably, still count as an information society service as these
elements are intrinsic to any intermediation activity. As the Court has held in a
judgment concerning eBay, the electronic facilitation of relations between sellers
and buyers, for example, is a typical information society service.13 This may be the
case for hotel or flight booking platforms, for example. In his opinion, Advocate
General Szpunar reaches a similar conclusion on the basis that, for hotel or flight
booking platforms, the provision of the substantive service is (often) economic-
ally independent from the intermediation.14 If, however, a thorough screening
11 Szpunar, n 1 above, para 51.
12 See, on regulatory arbitrage in general, V. Fleischer, ‘Regulatory Arbitrage’ (2010) 89 Texas
Law Review 227 (2010); on regulatory arbitrage in the sharing economy Calo and Rosenblat, n 10
above.
13 CJEU, case 324/09 L’Oréal and Others EU:C:2011:474, para 109.
14 Szpunar, n 1 above, para 34.
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procedure is conducted as part of the selection of suppliers, this introduces a
control element that could, depending on the degree of vetting involved, be
sufficient to qualify as decisive influence in the understanding of this Case Note.
This brings us to the third question: why exactly does the fulfillment of the
three criteria result in the service offered by the platform not being an information
society service anymore? The CJEU argues succinctly that intermediation, when
accompanied by the three criteria, amounts to an overall service, whose main
component is the substantive service provided, in Uber’s case that being transpor-
tation. If the preceding analysis is correct, this is precisely the result of the control
element. However, the Court then only apodictically states that this overall
service ‘must be qualified not as “an information society service”’, but as a
transportation service. There are two possible doctrinal explanations for the
incompatibility of the control element with an information society service. First,
one might argue that the legal consequences of qualifying a composite service
simultaneously as a transportation and as an information society service are
incompatible. This may be what A. G. Szpunar has in mind when he states that the
classification of UberPop as an information society service ‘would not permit the
attainment of the objectives of liberalisation underpinning Directive 2000/31’.15
This is due to the specific regulatory framework surrounding transportation: the
freedom to provide services does not apply, neither through Article 56 TFEU nor
through the Services Directive. However, as mentioned earlier, the hallmark of
information society services is that their providers, pursuant to Article 3 of the E-
Commerce Directive, benefit from substantial freedom to provide the services.
This explanation would imply that the relevance of the judgment is limited to
transportation applications (and perhaps other areas exempted from the scope of
the Services Directive under its Article 2(2)) since other applications, even if they
are deemed to be providing the substantial service their suppliers offer, may avail
themselves of the freedom to provide services. However, the Court seems to base
its conclusion not to qualify the platform service as an information society service
on the unitary qualification of the overall service as a transportation service. This
suggests a better doctrinal explanation that follows the reasoning of the Advocate
General in his opinion:16 the control element transforms the digital intermediation
service into an overall service that, at least primarily, is not delivered electro-
nically and at a distance, but physically and on the ground directly between the
involved parties. Therefore, two decisive elements of an information society
service (electronic provision; at a distance) are lacking; indeed, Article 1(2) of
15 Szpunar, n 1 above, para 65.
16 Szpunar, n 1 above, 29–35.
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Directive 98/34/EC demands that information society services must be ‘entirely
transmitted [...] by [...] electromagnetic means’.17 This is precisely why Recital 18
of the E-Commerce Directive states that information society services do not cover
the provision of services off-line.18
In this understanding, the control element makes a qualification of the plat-
form as a provider of information society services impossible if the substantively
provided service is not itself an information society service, but some activity
carried out in the ‘real economy’. According to Recital 18 and Article 2(h)(ii) of the
E-Commerce Directive, not only offline services, but also the delivery of goods are
excluded from information society services. Therefore, many of the substantive
services intermediated by digital platforms will not qualify as information society
services – be it the provision of accommodation (Airbnb), food preparation and
delivery (Deliveroo), the conduct of air travel (Expedia), construction and repair
(myhammer), or other works and services. If this reconstruction of the reasoning
of the Court is accepted, the relevance of the judgment is not limited to transpor-
tation applications, but the criteria apply more broadly to any type of digital
intermediation exercise.
The second part of the test – the qualification of the overall service according
to its main component – is less novel and finds precedent in case law of the Court
and the opinion of the Advocate General.19 In another recent case, Schottelius, the
Court held that the distinction between contracts of sale and contracts for work or
services, for the purpose of determining the scope of application of Directive 1999/
44/EC on the sale of consumer goods, also follows the principal obligation if both
sale and work or service components are present in a contractual arrangement.20
This follows a long-standing tradition in Member State contract law to qualify
contracts exhibiting components of different contractual types according to the
main component of the contract, if it can be reliably identified.21 This method is
not unchallenged,22 but seems to be favored by the CJEU. Only where EU law itself
distinguishes between different components of the contract, for example between
the online sale and the delivery of these goods under Recital 18 and Article 2(h)(ii)
of the E-Directive Commerce, does the Court split the contract up into parts
governed by different legal regimes.23 Rightly understood, a flexible regime is
17 Emphasis added; see also Szpunar, n 1 above, para 29.
18 See CJEU, case 108/09 Ker-Optika EU:C:2010:725, para 33.
19 Szpunar, n 1 above, para 35.
20 CJEU, case 247/16 Schottelius EU:C:2017:638, para 38 and 44.
21 Cf, eg, Emmerich, in Münchener Kommentar, BGB (7th ed, Munich: Beck, 2016) § 311 para 29.
22 Id.
23 CJEU, case 108/09Ker-Optika EU:C:2010:725, para 24–31.
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needed. One will even have to resort to the provisions governing ancillary aspects
of a contractual arrangement if only these provisions contain adequate solutions
for the problems of the specific case. For packages comprising intermediation and
substantive services, however, it makes sense to generally resort to the rules
governing substantive services as these services, and not the intermediation
exercise, leave the strongest imprint on the main economic parameters of the
exchange process.
IV Implications of the Judgment for the Platform
Economy
The preceding discussion suggests that the judgment has wider implications for
the platform economy. There are, of course, many different types of platforms that
operate in the digital economy. Very broadly speaking, on the one hand, commu-
nication platforms, such as Facebook or other social media networks, seek to
incentivize customers to share data and spend time on the platform. Their busi-
ness model, based on multi-sided markets,24 largely consists in selling, to third
parties, user data or advertisements that are personalized with the help of the data
collected from the platform’s users. Their success is largely due to direct and
indirect network effects (between one user category and across different sides of
the market).25 Search engines similarly provide their search services ‘for free’, ie,
in exchange for personal data, while monetizing the data in the selling of adver-
tisements and data. Uber, on the other hand, belongs to those platforms primarily
intermediating services, works, or goods (while also collecting data, of course).
Airbnb, Amazon, eBay, myhammer, Deliveroo and others are prominent examples
of these intermediation platforms.
Concerning social media networks, the CJEU has already held that they
constitute, at least in principle, information society services.26 Entirely different
questions are raised in competition law by the properties of multi-sided markets
that have already been the subject of competition proceedings at the European
24 For the economics two-sided platforms, see J.-C. Rochet and J. Tirole, ‘Platform Competition
in Two-Sided Markets’ (2003) 1 Journal of the European Economic Association 990; M. Armstrong,
‘Competition in Two-SidedMarkets’ (2006) 37 The RAND Journal of Economic 668.
25 Cf P. Belleflamme and M. Peitz, Industrial Organization: Markets and Strategies (2nd ed, Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015) ch 20.
26 CJEU, case 360/10 Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers CVBA (SABAM)
EU:C:2012:85, para 27.
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level.27 Both in the case of social media networks and search engines, the implica-
tions of the judgment are limited. In these cases, one may validly apply the two-
step test, and will particularly have to look at the main component of the services
offered to determine the applicable regulatory context. However, this is unlikely
to result in novel insights: there is generally no offline activity inherently linked
to the online service that could, if sufficiently controlled by the platform, trans-
form its activities into an overall service outside of the scope of information
society services. This may change if social media networks, in the future, start
intermediating services and goods to a greater extent, too.28
Therefore, at the moment, intermediation platforms stand to be most affected
by the present judgment. To determine the rules applicable to them, courts will
arguably have to use the three criteria the CJEUmentions. Broadly speaking, if the
application restricts itself to mere intermediation (ie, matchmaking), it will be
considered an information society service and will be able to avail itself of the
privileges and freedoms contained in the E-Commerce Directive, for example. If,
however, the application also assumes decisive control over the substantive
service the supply side provides, in other words, if the provision of that service is
inherently linked to the use of the platform, the platform itself will become
subject to the substantive rules governing the service it facilitates. This is the truly
revolutionary potential of the judgment that stands to upset the business model
of a number of intermediation platforms that seek to gain competitive advantages
by evading substantive regulation while providing services equivalent to those
traditional competitors offer (regulatory arbitrage).29
Within the scope of this Case Note, it is of course impossible to survey
exhaustively the broad variety of platforms that exist on the market. Therefore,
this section will restrict itself to map out the consequences of the judgment for (i)
other types of transportation intermediation models and for (ii) selected other
platforms such Airbnb.
27 See, eg, European Commission, decision in case AT.39740 of 27 June 2017 Google Search
(Shopping); see also S. Grundmann and Ph. Hacker, ‘Digital Technology as a Challenge to
European Contract Law’ (2017) 13 European Review of Contract Law 255, 273 with further refer-
ences.
28 See, eg, FacebookMarketplace, https://www.facebook.com/marketplace/learn-more.
29 See above n 12.
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1 Implications for Transportation Platforms (Lyft, UberTaxi,
UberBlack)
In the realm of transportation applications, there are three different business
models that transport applications pursue, depending on the type of driver
conducting the travel on the ground. Ride-sharing models (like UberPool, Lyft
Line,30 or Allygator31) may be implemented within each of the three types. At one
end of the spectrum, the application connects customers to non-professional
drivers without a transportation license (Lyft;32 UberPop, often also UberX,
UberXL, and UberSelect33). This business model has essentially been buried in the
EU by the present judgment. UberTaxi stands at the opposite end of the spectrum
by using regular taxis for transportation. Therefore, to the extent that these taxis
comply with local taxi regulation, such applications should not encounter sig-
nificant legal problems even if the platform was regarded as a transportation
service provider for this service, too. However, it is also the least interesting case
as it is not significantly different from any other taxi application. What is most
interesting, therefore, is an intermediate business model in which rental car
companies holding a license to transport persons conduct the transport on the
ground. Examples for this business model are UberBlack and UberSUV, which
only distinguish themselves by the types of car used.34 This model is particularly
intriguing not only because it sits analytically between UberPop and UberTaxi,
but also because the Bundesgerichtshof (German Federal Private Law Supreme
Court, BGH) has submitted a request for a preliminary ruling concerning the
provision of an information society service by UberBlack in May 2017 that is still
pending before the Court.35 In this business model, Uber cooperates with rental
30 See https://www.lyft.com/line.
31 See https://www.allygatorshuttle.com/en/index.html.
32 See Lyft, ‘Frequently Asked Questions’, https://www.lyft.com/drive-with-lyft. So far, Lyft has
not operated in the EU, see Darrell Etherington, ‘Lyft’s first market outside the U. S. will be Canada
with a December launch in Toronto’ Tech Crunch (13 November 2017), https://techcrunch.com/20
17/11/13/lyfts-first-market-outside-the-u-s-will-be-canada-with-a-december-launch-in-toronto/.
33 DougH, ‘What’s the difference between UberX, XL, UberSelect, and Black Car?’ RideSharing-
Driver (30 August 2016), https://www.ridesharingdriver.com/whats-the-difference-between-uber
x-xl-uberplus-and-black-car/; see also n 34.
34 Furthermore, UberX, UberXL and UberSelect may, in some countries with restrictive legisla-
tion such as Germany, also use this business model, see Julana, ‘uberX – Now available in
Germany’ Uber Blog (18 May 2015), https://www.uber.com/de/blog/dusseldorf/uberx-now-also-
available-in-germany/.
35 Bundesgerichtshof (BGH), order of 18 May 2017 in case I ZR 3/16 Uber Black [sic] DE:BGH:
2017:180517BIZR3.16.0.
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car companies authorized to provide transportation services. In Germany, where
the case originated, these rental car companies are subject to regulatory provi-
sions similar to the ones covering taxis when they transport persons against
remuneration. Given the criteria used by the Court in its present judgment, it is
highly likely that it will find that UberBlack equally constitute a transportation,
and not an information society service. As the BGH noted in its reference, Uber
handles the payments, determines the advertising campaigns, and controls the
conditions of the transportation service in the case of UberBlack, too.36 Just like in
the case of UberPop, the platform sets the maximum fare for UberBlack as well
and therefore decisively influences the pricing of the service.37 This seems to
suggest that all of the three criteria mentioned by the Court, including the decisive
control criterion, are fulfilled by UberBlack. This would imply that UberBlack
needs to abide by the German regulation covering rental car companies that
transport persons, which it arguably violated in one specific dimension (see
below, Section V).
2 Implications for Other Types of Platforms (Amazon, Expedia,
Airbnb)
For intermediation platforms outside of the transportation sector, the three criter-
ia the Court established will be applicable, too (see above, at the end of Sectio-
n III). However, platforms merely facilitating an online sale of goods constitute
information society services irrespective of the degree of control they assume in
the sales process since the facilitated activity, the conclusion of a contract of sale
online (but not the delivery of the good, Article 2(h)(ii) of the E-Commerce
Directive), is itself the epitome of an information society service.38 The CJEU has
implicitly affirmed from this for eBay;39 the same should hold for Amazon. There-
fore, the judgment will unfold its full meaning for intermediation platforms
facilitating services or works, such as Expedia, myhammer, Airbnb, booking.com
and others. Here, courts will have to ask whether the platform restricts itself to
36 BGH, n 35 above, para 36.
37 BGH, n 35 above. para 37.
38 Recital 18 of the E-Commerce Directive; CJEU, case 108/09 Ker-Optika EU:C:2010:725, para 24–
25 and 29–30.
39 CJEU, case 324/09 L’Oréal and Others EU:C:2011:474, para 109–117 (noting that eBay may not
qualify as a ‘host’ under art 14 of the E-Commerce Directive if it significantly influences the
purchasing process, but not mentioning that it may not qualify as an information service provider
in this case).
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mere intermediation or implements an ‘intermediation plus control’ business
model. Platforms that only register actors on the demand and supply side and
facilitate matchmaking, such as many flight booking platforms, should count as
providers of information society services. Even if they establish rating systems, as
hotel reservation platforms often do, this should not count as ‘decisive influence’
over the provision of the accommodation service if it only facilitates reputation
building and does not serve as a basis for sanctions against those scoring below a
certain threshold.40
In the case of Airbnb, however, one may argue that the platform does follow
an ‘intermediation plus control’ business model. Not only does Airbnb handle the
payment for the accommodation via direct subsidiaries41 and provide a guarantee
to landlords for the reimbursement of damages,42 but it also implements a screen-
ing procedure, including the right to exclude members falling below a rating
threshold.43 While the price is not influenced by Airbnb, the platform does reserve
itself the right to stipulate rules for the presentation of the housing offer.44
Importantly, it even runs a dispute resolution mechanism.45 It may furthermore
be of relevance that Airbnb, not necessarily but often, creates supply by connect-
ing travellers with non-professional providers of accommodation that, but for the
platform, would likely not have provided the service at all (as in the case of
UberPop). Therefore, while controlling the substantive service less than Uber
(particularly the price dimension), Airbnb still exercises significant control over
the accommodation service, especially through the screening/exclusion proce-
dure and the dispute resolution mechanism. Hence, while being a borderline
case, it should arguably be considered not as a provider of an information society
service, but of accommodation (and, in view of the expansion of the business
model toward events: other) services. Following the criteria of the Uber case,
Airbnb is therefore likely subject to local housing regulation, but also to anti-
discrimination legislation applicable to landlords.46 This could be important in
40 Cf also Szpunar, n 1 above, para 59.
41 https://www.airbnb.com/terms/payments_terms.
42 Grundmann and Hacker, n 27 above, 274.
43 § 2.3 et seq of the Airbnb Terms of Service, https://www.airbnb.com/terms.
44 § 7.1.4 of the Airbnb Terms of Service, https://www.airbnb.com/terms.
45 § 9.7 of the Airbnb Terms of Service, https://www.airbnb.com/terms.
46 Art 3(1)(h) of Directive 2000/43/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between
persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, OJEC 2000 L 180/22; art 3(1) of Directive 2004/113/
EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between men and women in the access to and
supply of goods and services,OJEC 2004 L 373/37.
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view of empirical evidence of racial discrimination on Airbnb.47 The same holds
true, mutatis mutandis, for food delivery applications tracking and controlling
their contributing restaurants and delivery personnel.
For digital intermediation platforms, the judgment therefore entails a non-
trivial trade-off: the more they seek to control the quality of the substantial
product they intermediate, the more they run the risk of becoming subject to
substantial regulation. Companies will therefore have to weigh the expected
increase of compliance costs that comes with tighter control over the product
against the expected increase in profits flowing from better quality and organiza-
tion.
V Time for a Regulatory Review
To the extent that the judgment subjects platforms that exercise decisive influ-
ence over the substantive service to the same rules as traditional providers of the
service, the judgment is convincing. It holds the potential for fostering competi-
tion on the merits between similarly situated service providers. However, it also
points to the pressing necessity of revising some of these rules and adapting them
to the digital present. Outside of the transportation sector, Article 56 TFEU and
the Services Directive will be applicable and regulation may therefore have to
stand up to scrutiny under the freedom to provide services. Furthermore, Member
State fundamental rights protecting the freedom to conduct business will be
applicable, or Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union, depending on the facts of the case (cf Article 51(1) of the Charter).
One obvious case for reform is the requirement, in many local taxi regula-
tions, that drivers learn by heart thousands of street names and their location; in
the age of ubiquitous and reliable GPS navigation, this is clearly a waste of time
and resources. The order of reference by the BGH in the matter of UberBlack is
another case in point. If UberBlack is considered a transportation service, it must
comply with German transportation regulation. Unlike the case of UberPop, Uber
in this case operates with a company that holds an authorization for transporting
persons. However, the way the service is organized violates a specific provision
47 B. Edelman, M. Luca and D. Svirsky, ‘Racial Discrimination in the Sharing Economy: Evi-
dence from a Field Experiment’ (2017) 9 American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 1;
D. Wang, S. Xi and J. Gilheany, ‘The Model Minority? Not on Airbnb.com: A Hedonic Pricing
Model to Quantify Racial Bias against Asian Americans’ (2015) Technology Science, https://tech
science.org/a/2015090104/. It should be noted that these studies establish discrimination by
hosts and guests, not by Airbnb in the performance of its own platform services.
94 Philipp Hacker
of German transportation regulation (the so-called return rule). According to
§ 49(4)(3) of the Law on the Transportation of Persons (Personenbeförderungsge-
setz), rental cars that transport persons have to return immediately to their seat
of business, unless they have received a new transportation request from the seat
of business before arriving at the seat of business. This return duty differentiates
rental car companies transporting persons from taxis. In the case of UberBlack,
however, customers request the vehicle via the app, and the request is routed to
an Uber server in the Netherlands. That server directly contacts the closest vehicle
and simultaneously sends a transportation notice to the seat of business of the
rental car company.48 This, however, violates the return rule since the request is
not first sent to the seat of business and then communicated to the vehicle driver.
The justification for the existence of this provision, however, is more than
dubious. The BGH reasons that the provision is necessary and appropriate to
protect taxi companies from competition by rental car companies. According to
the German court, rental car companies suffer from two decisive disadvantages
vis-à-vis taxi companies that make the protection of the taxi market a legitimate
aim.49 First, taxis are subjected to regulated prices; second, they are under an
obligation to contract with passengers irrespective of the location of the passen-
ger. Upon closer scrutiny, however, it is unclear whether consumers would be
really worse off with respect to these two parameters if taxis were partially, or
even completely, replaced by UberBlack-type rental car companies. If competition
is significant, and pricing transparent, there should be no need to regulate
transportation prices in the first place. Now, there are reports about price hikes by
Uber in times of high demand or when users are about to run out of battery (surge
pricing).50 To combat this problem, however, it seems sufficient to introduce price
caps for rental car personal transport, instead of ruling out an entire service type
via an inefficient communication obligation. Concerning the absence of anobliga-
tion to contract with passengers, the BGH notes that this obligation benefits
customers in less frequented and more inaccessible areas. However, it is far from
clear whether increased competitive pressure from digital ride-hailing companies
would worsen or improve access to transportation for non-central areas. As the
author has repeatedly experienced himself, even taxis under an obligation to
48 BGH, n 35 above, para 20.
49 BGH, n 35 above, para 43.
50 J. Cascarelli, ‘The Uber Hangover: That Bar Tab Might Not Be the Only Thing You’ll Regret in
the Morning’ The New Yorker (27 December 2013), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2013/12/
uber-surge-pricing-model.html; see also Ph. Hacker, ‘Personal data, exploitative contracts, and
algorithmic fairness: autonomous vehicles meet the internet of things’ (2017) 7 International Data
Privacy 266, 272–273; Szpunar, n 1 above, para 15.
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contract do not reliably respond to transportation requests from more forlorn
parts of Berlin, for example. Moreover, as a matter of policy priority, it might be
advisable to invest in public transportation rather than aiming to guarantee
maximum coverage of private transportation.
It must therefore be welcomed that the BGH explicitly raised the question of
the justification of the German return rule in the light of Article 16 of the Services
Directive.51 Similarly, the ‘disruptive’ practices of other online platforms should
be taken as an indication that, sometimes, regulation might be outdated or at
least in need of substantial review. Needless to say, to the extent that, eg,
housing, anti-discrimination or foodstuff regulation pursue legitimate aims in
appropriate ways, they will be justified and should be applied, within and beyond
the digital economy. In this sense, as this Case Note has shown, the criteria of the
Uber case may well harbinger an era of new regulatory oversight over so far
‘unregulated’ platform services – but perhaps also of a critical review of some of
the substantive regulatory provisions themselves.
51 The BGH only raised the question, however, for the case that UberBlack is not qualified as a
transportation service (BGH, n 35 above, para 40). If this was the case, the provision would have
to be justified vis-à-vis art 12 of the German Constitution; the German Constitutional Court
(Bundesverfassungsgericht) has affirmed the constitutionality of this rule in 1989: BVerfGE 81, 70,
Neue JuristischeWochenschrift 1990, 1349.
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